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Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous 
Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence 
on Violent Conflict*
MATTHIAS BASEDAU & JANN LAY
German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg
The ‘resource curse’ hypothesis claims that abundance in natural resources, particularly oil,  encourages 
especially civil war. Natural resources provide both motive and opportunity for conflict and create 
indirect institutional and economic causes of instability. Contrarily, the theory of the rentier state – 
largely neglected in the study of peace and war in this respect – suggests that regimes use revenue from 
abundant resources to buy off peace through patronage, large-scale distributive policies and effective 
repression. Consequently, such rentier states would tend to be more stable politically and less prone to 
conflict. These two theories thus imply ambivalent effects of resource abundance on conflict proneness. 
This article presents part of a solution to this apparent puzzle for the case of oil-producing countries. 
The key argument is that both resource wealth per capita and resource dependence need to be taken 
into account, since only the availability of very high per capita revenues from oil allows governments 
to achieve internal stability. The empirical analysis supports this hypothesis. The findings of multivari-
ate cross-country regressions indicate a U-shaped relationship between oil dependence and civil war 
onset, while high resource wealth per capita tends to be associated with less violence. The results of a 
macro-qualitative comparison for a reduced sample of highly dependent oil exporters are even more 
clearcut. Using the same reduced sample, we find that oil-wealthy countries apparently manage to 
maintain political stability by a combination of large-scale distribution, high spending on the security 
 apparatus and protection by outsiders. Compared to oil-poor countries and in contradiction to the 
rentier state theory, the institutions of oil-wealthy countries do not seem to be particularly characterized 
by  patronage and clientelism.
economic decline and civil war. In the study 
of peace and war, natural resources are said to 
provide both finance and motive for armed 
conflict and to create  indirect  economic 
and institutional causes of  violence (Ross, 
2006; Humphreys, 2005; Fearon, 2005). 
Numerous  empirical  studies have provided 
evidence that  natural-resource dependent 
and rich countries indeed seem to be more 
likely to lapse into violence (see Ross, 
2004, 2006).
Introduction
The growing literature on the ‘resource 
curse’ (Sachs & Warner, 1995; Auty, 2001) 
and the ‘paradox of plenty’ (Karl, 1997) 
has been linking the extraction of natural 
resources to  corruption, authoritarianism, 
* The data and self-contained STATA-codes to perform 
the multivariate analyses of this article, as well as the 
appendices, are available at http://www.prio.no/jpr/data-
sets. Correspondence: Basedau@giga-hamburg.de.
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However, the resource-conflict link is 
probably more complex than conceptual-
ized in the scientific mainstream. Empirical 
studies have shown that on average, oil and 
lootable resources favour violent conflict 
(Ross, 2004), but, beyond averages, for one 
resource abundant or dependent country 
affected, two are spared from violence (Ross, 
2003). As a result, the debate has begun to 
look at context conditions as well as the exact 
causal mechanisms determining whether or 
not the resource curse strikes and the manner 
in which it does so (Ross, 2006; Humphreys, 
2005; Collier & Hoeffler, 2005: 627). A more 
radical theoretical challenge to the ‘resource 
curse’ can be derived from the theory of the 
rentier state. Rentier state theory identifies 
economic stagnation, corruption and author-
itarianism as features inherent to the rentier 
political economy. However, it also states – 
contrarily to the resource curse and widely 
empirically untested – that governments use 
abundant resources to buy off opposition or 
suppress armed rebellion, thereby contribut-
ing to political stability and preventing 
armed conflict.
This article addresses this relative neglect 
of stabilizing effects suggested by the concept 
of the rentier state. We put two pertinent 
hypotheses to test which may explain why 
some oil-producing countries are spared from 
violence and others are not. Our first hypoth-
esis is that very high per capita revenues from 
oil allow governments to avoid conflict. We 
assess this hypothesis by including a measure 
of oil wealth per capita into the multivariate 
framework proposed by Collier & Hoeffler 
(2004). These cross-country regressions, which 
are based on modified replication datasets, 
show an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between revenues from oil per capita and 
violent conflict, while we find a destabilizing 
effect of oil dependence measured in terms 
of oil exports as a share of GDP. In addition, 
we perform a macro-qualitative comparison 
in a reduced sample of highly dependent oil 
exporters, which demonstrates that among 
these countries, those oil-rich in per capita 
terms are almost completely spared from vio-
lent conflict.
The second hypothesis refers to the opera-
tion of the political mechanisms suggested 
mainly by the rentier state theory. Using a 
sample of oil-exporting countries, we find 
evidence that countries rich in oil per capita 
manage to maintain peace by a combina-
tion of large-scale distribution, high spend-
ing on the security apparatus, protection by 
outsiders and relatively more favourable state 
institutions.
The article is organized as follows. We 
first provide an overview of the literature, 
showing that the effects of natural resources 
on civil conflict are fairly ambiguous in 
both theoretical and empirical terms. We 
then derive the main hypotheses and out-
line our empirical strategy, which is fol-
lowed by a presentation and discussion of 
the empirical results. Finally, we summar-
ize major findings and highlight areas for 
future research.
The Resource Curse: A Negative 
Effect of Natural Resources on Peace
The academic debate on the resource–civil 
war link has been dominated by the notion 
of an adverse effect of natural resources on 
peace. It was Collier & Hoeffler’s (2001) 
influential work on ‘greed and grievance’ 
that stimulated a large number of subse-
quent studies. Collier & Hoeffler (2004) 
argue that wealth in primary commodities 
increases the likelihood of civil war onset by 
providing opportunity and motive (‘greed’) 
for armed rebel activity, rather than by 
causing grievance that in turn would trig-
ger conflict. These ideas have been further 
developed, extended and modified in the 
literature. Humphreys (2005) has probably 
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clientelism), which in turn makes internal 
violent conflict more likely (see Fearon, 
2005; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).2 (6) Finally, 
the ‘sparse network mechanism’ argues that 
rentier economies have a one-sided integra-
tion in the world economy and, hence, can-
not develop these ‘thick’ terms of exchange 
which have been identified as conducive to 
peace and stability.
All of these mechanisms (see Table I) 
work more or less indirectly and therefore 
involve numerous contextual conditions. 
In particular, the literature has emphasized 
the relevance of the characteristics of the 
available resource (Le Billon, 2001; Auty, 
2001; Ross, 2003). Especially ‘lootability’ 
makes a difference with respect to the feasi-
bility of rebellion. As Le Billon (2001) 
notes, the exploitation of so called ‘dis-
tant’ and  ‘diffuse’ resources such as alluvial 
diamonds, timber or drugs can hardly be 
controlled by the central government – 
hence, rebels can ‘loot’ them more easily 
than deep shaft gems or off-shore oil pro-
duction, which in addition require sophis-
ticated technical know-how. Such ‘point’ 
resources are more likely to trigger power 
struggles over the control of the central 
provided the most inclusive compilation of 
six possible causal mechanisms (and sev-
eral subtypes) for civil war onset.1 (1) The 
‘greedy rebels’ mechanism is in line with 
Collier & Hoeffler’s (2005) argument and 
suggests that the booty character of natural 
resources motivates rebels to take up arms 
and/or continue fighting. (2) In an external 
variant, ‘greedy outsiders’ might be ready to 
intervene militarily either directly or through 
support for internal warring factions in order 
to gain or maintain control over lucrative 
resources. (3) In contrast, the ‘grievance’ 
transmission channel suggests that perceived 
deprivation of producing regions and social 
groups or indirect negative economic con-
sequences of resource wealth, such as the 
‘Dutch disease’, price shocks or uneven dis-
tribution of revenues, create ‘grievances’ and 
trigger violent uprising, especially secession-
ism in producing regions. (4) Similarly to 
crime stories, civil wars do not only require a 
motive, but also an opportunity. The ‘feasi-
bility mechanism’ refers to natural resources 
providing the means for rebel finance. 
(5) The ‘weak state’ mechanism draws on 
the harmful effects of resource abundance on 
the quality of state institutions ( corruption, 
1 Humphreys (2005: 514–518) also develops a number 
of – partly deviating – causal mechanisms for civil war 
duration (see also Ross, 2006: 282).
2  Though not mentioned by Humphreys or Fearon, a 
weak state, particularly in remote areas, also facilitates the 
formation of armed rebel movements.
Table I. Causal Mechanisms Connecting Resources to Civil War Onset
Working primarily through Effect on peace-mechanism
Fuelling war Avoiding war
Motive Greedy rebels Large-scale distribution
Greedy outsiders
Grievances 
Weak state (1) Selective co-optation
Sparse networks
Opportunity Feasibility (rebel finance) Repression (security apparatus)
Weak state (2) Outside protectors
On the basis of Humphreys (2005), Le Billon (2001) and others. 
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not identical (de Soysa, 2002a: 8–9; Ross, 
2006: 266), although the literature has 
largely treated both variables – somewhat 
unconsciously – as synonymous. According 
to our understanding, dependence means that 
rents from resources are the most import-
ant source of income relative to other value-
adding activities, while abundance or wealth 
refers to the absolute amount of resource rents 
available in per capita terms. It can be easily 
illustrated that these two variables may differ 
substantially. Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, for 
instance, were almost equally dependent on 
oil exports in 2002 – oil exports accounted 
for 38.9% and 38.5% of GDP, respectively. 
Yet, if the governments had decided to pay 
out the proceeds from oil exports to their 
citizens, Nigerians would have been given a 
mere US$ 140 while Saudi Arabia’s citizens 
would have earned US$ 2,715.
Differentiating between wealth and depend -
ence has implications for the analysis of 
the aforementioned mechanisms. Generally 
speaking, countries do not need to be wealthy 
for most of the mechanisms to be operat-
ing. It might be dependence that makes 
conflict likelier in the first place: only in 
economies with a monolithic structure that 
offers limited alternatives to earn income is 
the resource in question likely to become 
a  problem. Obviously, the ‘grievance’ and 
‘sparse networks’ mechanism are directly 
related to dependence. It is likely, how-
ever, that ‘greed’ among potential rebels also 
depends on abundance. For outsiders, it may 
not even be the amount per capita, but rather 
the absolute amount of resources available 
in a country – possibly relative to global 
scarcity – that determines violent interven-
tions. ‘Feasibility’ will also partly depend on 
wealth, as some means for rebellion require 
substantial resources for internationally 
traded goods, mainly arms. However, as we 
will demonstrate in the following section, it 
is equally probable that resource wealth will 
be used to maintain peace.
state, or, if  concentrated in  certain regions 
(‘point’ and ‘distant’), secessionist upris-
ings (Le Billon, 2001: 31).3
Such resource-specific conditions are not 
limited to the type of resource and/or the 
related characteristics of resource extraction. 
The external structure of demand may be 
important. Powerful importing countries 
may be ready to intervene militarily – either 
directly or through support for warring fac-
tions. Of course, the quality of resource gov-
ernance can make a difference. Cases such 
as Botswana, Chile and Norway – that have 
fairly successfully managed their resource 
wealth – suggest that it may matter who 
gets the money and especially where it goes 
to afterwards. The quality of governance 
and the likelihood of conflict will depend 
on country-specific characteristics such as 
the general level of development, relations 
between identity groups, general quality 
of state institutions and agency of central 
actors. Once resource production has begun 
or become a realistic option, this will also 
affect the political economy more broadly. 
Yet, a robust set of favourable structural con-
ditions, working institutions, a careful man-
agement of the resource sector – including 
possibly rather private than state ownership 
(Luong & Weinthal, 2006) – and responsible 
leadership may prevent resource-rich coun-
tries lapsing into violence and other pitfalls 
of resource production. Only recently have 
all the above conditions come to the fore of 
the debate (see Humphreys, 2005) and they 
have been declared a ‘key research agenda’ 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2005: 627).
This discussion, however, has neglected 
a further differentiation, which refers to the 
independent variable. A country’s depend-
ence on and its abundance of resources are 
3 Relevant characteristics beyond ‘lootability’ refer to 
whether resource production is easily ‘obstructable’ by 
opponents and whether the trade with resources is legal 
(Ross, 2003).
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(2) The opportunity for rebellion may 
also be obstructed by external support 
for resource-fuelled regimes, especially 
in the case of the major oil-producing 
countries. Given their vital role for 
energy security (or supply of other com-
modities of vital interest), the major 
powers might deter internal rebellion or 
even come to the rescue when ‘greedy 
outsiders’ threaten to attack the country 
(see Humphreys, 2005: 533).
(3) Elites may use not only sticks to 
impede armed opposition, but also 
carrots. Revenues can be used in a pro-
active manner to buy off demands and 
opposition. This cooptation effect, 
largely observed by scholars studying 
the Middle East oil monarchies, can 
come in several shapes: governments 
may engage in large-scale  distributive 
or ‘populist’ policies (Le  Billon, 2001: 
565) by boosting public sector employ-
ment, allocating subsidies, or provid-
ing free education and healthcare. As 
a consequence, potential rebel leaders 
might not emerge or will find it diffi-
cult to recruit rank and file members. 
Possibly, this strategy can be pursued in 
a less proactive manner. Since resource 
rents render taxation unnecessary for 
incumbents, citizens may feel less 
motiv ated to protest or take up arms 
against a government that does not levy 
any taxes. However, this argument is at 
least ambigu ous: a government that 
does not depend on its citizens’ taxes 
may be less accountable and would not 
develop an efficient (tax-collecting) 
bureaucracy. By reducing the quality of 
state institutions as a whole, violence 
may be triggered (Smith, 2004: 233; 
Humphreys, 2005: 512–513; Snyder & 
Bhavnani, 2005).
(4) Finally, elites may distribute rents selec-
tively and create clientelist networks, 
from which only leaders of politically 
The Rentier State: A Stabilizing 
Effect of Revenues from Natural 
Resources
The conventional notion that natural 
resources harm internal peace is at least 
partially in contradiction to the theory of 
the rentier state, which stipulates a positive 
effect of resource abundance on political 
stability under authoritarian regimes. The 
concept of the rentier state was developed 
with regard to Middle Eastern oil-producing 
states such as Iran and the Gulf Monarchies 
(Madhavy, 1970; Beblawi & Luciani, 1987; 
Smith, 2004: 233–235) and argues that the 
main function of the state in rentier eco-
nomies is to distribute rent. In the resource 
curse literature, it has received attention only 
in so far as it predicts many of the negative 
consequences of oil dependence on the econ-
omy, institutions and democracy (see, for 
instance, Ross, 2001), which have been iden-
tified as indirect causes of violence. Yet, rents 
also provide ruling elites with vital resources 
through which to offset these indirect nega-
tive effects on stability (Luciani, 1987: 7; 
Karl, 1997: 21–22). In rentier states, various 
mechanisms are at work and they operate, as 
in the resource curse theory, through motive 
and/or opportunity (see also Ross, 2001; 
Smith, 2004).4
(1) The ‘repression mechanism’ primar-
ily affects the feasibility of rebellion. 
Govern ments might spend resource 
revenue on a huge state security appar-
atus, which enables them to suppress 
any possible opposition that might take 
up arms. According to the rentier state 
concept, repression will extend to the 
suppression of political freedoms, that 
is, authoritarian rule.
4 Some authors in the resource–conflict debate, espe-
cially Le Billon (2001: 565; 2003), have developed simi-
lar thoughts, however, without referring to the concept 
as such. Ross (2001) explicitly uses the concept, but his 
dependent variable is democracy, not conflict.
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on January 13, 2014jpr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
j ourna l  o f  P EACE R ESEARCH volume 46 / number 6 / november 2009762
A meta-analysis of 14 econometric studies 
by Ross (2004) finds that primary commod-
ities as a whole cannot be robustly linked 
to civil war onset and duration. According 
to his conclusions, the type of resource cer-
tainly matters. While no study under review 
by Ross can establish a relationship between 
agricultural commodities and violence, ‘loot-
able’ resources such as narcotics, timber and 
(alluvial) diamonds do not make the onset of 
civil war more likely, but seem to influence 
the duration of a conflict once it has bro-
ken out (see Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 
2005).5 Only oil-exporting countries seem to 
be particularly prone to civil war onset, espe-
cially secessionist uprisings such as in Angola, 
Indonesia and Nigeria. Further studies ques-
tion the notoriety of oil: Smith (2004) finds 
a positive effect of oil dependence on regime 
stability and peace in developing countries. 
Others (Fearon, 2005; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) 
have concentrated their criticism on the greed 
or feasibility mechanism and propose that the 
oil–violence nexus works through the weak 
state mechanism (see Ross, 2006: 290–291) 
or can be additionally attributed to effects of 
‘sparse networks’ (Humphreys, 2005).
The lack of clarity might be due to miss-
ing data and varying operationalizations of 
the dependent variable – civil war – as Ross 
(2004, 2006) suggests. Another pressing 
problem remains the inclusion of important 
intervening variables, in particular gover-
nance-related variables (Ross, 2004: 338). 
Moreover, it is remarkable that the poten-
tially stabilizing rentier effects – and respec-
tive intervening variables – have hardly 
been tested in cross-country studies. With 
contrasting results, Ross (2001) and Herb 
(2003) have investigated such effects on 
democracy, but not on peace and  security.6 
important groups benefit. Through this 
mechanism, resource revenues are dis-
tributed among a relatively small part 
of the population and access is granted 
through personal ties. By accommodat-
ing potential political rivals, this strategy 
is equally devised to maintain stability. 
This causal mechanism may also include 
practices that are commonly referred 
to as corruption – although the terms 
patronage or clientelism also embrace 
practices that are not strictly illegal – and 
thus connects to the debate on possibly 
stabilizing effects of corruption, as dis-
cussed, for instance, by Johnston (1986), 
Le Billon (2003) and Fjelde (2009).
The feasibility of successfully pursuing 
one, some or all of the strategies outlined 
above also depends on the context conditions 
discussed in the previous section. However, 
for a successful implementation of these pol-
icies, resource wealth seems to be crucial – 
rather than dependence. Buying out protest 
by large-scale distribution requires large 
amounts of revenue in per capita terms; this 
also holds true for a large security apparatus. 
The ‘clientelist network mechanism’ may be 
cheaper as long as the small portion of the 
population which benefits does not expect 
considerable amounts. Dependence will 
affect the feasibility of the outlined strat egies 
in most cases only indirectly and may be 
 irrelevant as long as there is enough money 
available.
Resources and Conflict: Empirical 
Evidence to Date
Many empirical studies have tried to demon-
strate that natural resources increase the risk 
of civil war onset and duration. Their results 
vary and it is fair to state that evidence on 
whether or not – and especially how –  natural 
resources and intrastate conflict are system-
atically linked remains fairly contested.
5 They find that secondary diamonds are positively linked 
to the incidence of civil war, while primary diamonds lower 
the risk of both civil war onset and duration.
6 In contrast to Ross, Herb finds that regional characteris-
tics rather than rentier effects hinder democracy.
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De Soysa, Humphreys and Ross all find that 
resource wealth increases the risk of civil war 
onset, although some of the results point to a 
more ambiguous effect. Humphreys’s results 
suggest at least ambivalent effects of oil pro-
duction per capita on outbreak of civil war 
in strong or ‘Weberian’ states (Humphreys, 
2005: 528). Ross’s analysis produces a 
remarkably robust relationship of fuel rents 
and different measures civil war onset, but 
he concedes that the relationship fits less well 
when using squared terms. In fact, none of 
the studies report results of squared terms and 
logged measures of per capita resource wealth, 
thus remaining silent on possible (and prob-
able) non-linear effects. The most serious 
challenge, however, is the fact that they use 
a per capita measure instead of sxp. In short, 
to date no article has been published that 
has tried to assess the simultaneous effect of 
dependence and wealth on civil war.8
Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy
Our main assumption is that the availability 
of large revenues per capita from resources 
can explain why in some cases the ‘resource 
curse’ is at work while in others the stabiliz-
ing rentier effect prevails. We formulate the 
following hypotheses:
H1:  Countries with very high revenues per 
capita from resources will be spared from 
civil conflict, even if highly dependent on 
resources. In contrast, if revenues remain 
relatively low, the dependence on resource 
rents should be harmful to peace.
H2:  Governments in countries with high 
revenues from resources maintain peace 
through (a) large-scale distributional 
Only Smith (2004) explicitly refers to the 
stabilizing rentier effects in oil states. Yet, his 
analysis of mechanisms focuses on repression 
in terms of the level of democratization, and 
he finds that the level of democratization 
does not account for regime stability.7
The reason why the empirical literature 
has been relatively silent on rentier effects 
may be the common operationalization of 
the independent variable – its failure to dis-
tinguish between resource wealth, on the one 
hand, and dependence, on the other. Since 
Sachs & Warner (1995), almost all studies 
have used share of resource exports in GDP 
(sxp) to proxy resource wealth (Ross, 2006: 
265–266). Resource wealth per capita is only 
very indirectly measured by GDP per cap-
ita, which implies that the effect of resource 
wealth and (non-resource) income per capita 
are confounded. Collier & Hoeffler (2004) 
find a curvilinear effect of natural resource 
dependence: the likelihood of civil conflict 
declines once a level of about 30% depen-
dence has been crossed. This may suggest that 
a country can indeed avoid military rebellion 
right from the outset if it is ‘sufficiently abun-
dant’ in terms of natural resources (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004).
Only a few studies use a per capita mea-
sure for resource wealth. De Soysa (2002b) is 
the only author in Ross’s meta-analysis (Ross, 
2004: 408) using a per capita measure – 
stocks per capita for mineral and other natural 
resources – arguing that the per capita mea-
sure might reflect wealth more accurately than 
the share of resource exports in GDP (sxp) (de 
Soysa, 2002b: 404), although it certainly mea-
sures potential rather than actual income. This 
is not true for Humphreys (2005) and Ross 
(2006), who test a number of causal mechan-
isms with per capita measures of income 
from both oil and diamond  production. 
7 Fjelde (2009) finds that the interaction of high levels of 
corruption and appropriable resources (oil wealth) reduces 
the conflict proneness of a country by offsetting the desta-
bilizing effect of resource abundance.
8 Just one paper (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008) has 
tested both variables and finds that resource abundance 
reduces the likelihood of civil war onset, while dependence 
seems to be a consequence rather than a cause of civil war. 
A revised version of the paper is forthcoming in Oxford 
Economic Papers.
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 dependent oil exporters as well. Working in 
such a framework also allows keeping indi-
vidual cases identifiable.
In principle, causal mechanisms could 
also be captured in a multivariate framework 
with a larger sample. A thorough discussion 
of possible approaches and the difficulties 
involved, in particular simultaneity and the 
corresponding identification problems, goes 
beyond the scope of this article, except for a 
short remark on interaction terms: although 
frequently applied in the empirical literature 
on transmission channels of the resource 
curse (e.g. Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, 
2006), introducing interaction terms (inter-
acting the resource variable with a ‘transmis-
sion channel proxy’) is of little meaning in 
our context. Interaction terms capture only 
that the effect of one explanatory variable 
varies with the level of another. Yet, our 
interest does not lie in such interactions – for 
example, in whether the effect of oil wealth/
dependence on political stability and con-
flict risk varies with the level of institutional 
quality (or vice versa) – but rather in causal 
relationships that may be observable just as 
simple correlations.
Assessing the Effect of Oil Wealth 
Per Capita on Civil War Onset
Multivariate Analysis
The specification of the multivariate analy-
sis follows Collier & Hoeffler (2004), CH 
hereafter. We hence try to predict the risk 
of a civil war onset during a five-year period 
using a logit model. Different specifica-
tions have been proposed in the literature. 
Fearon & Laitin (2003), FL hereafter, as 
well as Humphreys (2005) estimate logit 
(or rare events logit) models based on 
annual data. In our opinion, the latter pro-
cedure is likely to create significant endo-
geneity problems, even if lagged values are 
used as explanatory variables. This holds in 
policies (including a low tax burden), 
(b) clientelist networks, and/or (c) high 
spending on the security apparatus, as 
well as (d) external allies.
The empirical examination of these hypoth-
eses will focus on the case of oil. As already 
outlined, the debate has been vocal on 
the importance of resource type, and we 
acknowledge the relevance. Concentrating 
on one resource type reduces the number 
of possibly important surrounding condi-
tions, and we decided to choose oil because 
it is still – notwithstanding contrary results 
(e.g. Smith, 2004) – the most notorious resource 
type in terms of conflict-proneness (Ross, 
2004, 2006), thus allowing a hard test for 
our hypotheses. However, the choice of oil 
also affects the likelihood of causal mech-
anisms: because of the technical sophistication 
required for its exploitation, oil is probably 
less vulnerable to the rebellion feasibility 
mechanisms.
We employ a combination of method-
ologies to put our assumptions to the test. 
For the test of Hypothesis 1, we first employ 
cross-country regressions based on replication 
datasets. These regressions try to establish a 
‘reduced-form’ positive (negative) relation-
ship between oil wealth and civil war onset 
while controlling for other factors, especially 
oil dependence as measured by the share 
of exports in GDP. After this multivariate 
approach, we analyse this relationship in a 
macro-qualitative comparison for a reduced 
sample of highly dependent oil export-
ers that can include pertinent cases often 
excluded in replication data. Equally impor-
tant, this analysis allows us to disentangle 
the hypothesized effects of oil wealth from 
those of dependence, the levels of which are 
similar among the countries included. The 
causal mechanisms at work – Hypothesis 2 – 
will be examined in a macro-qualitative 
framework based on the reduced sample of 
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Explanatory variables that are likely to be 
heavily i nfluenced by civil war onset, such as 
GDP or polity, are averages of the preced-
ing five-year period. Other variables, such 
as population and fractionalization proxies, 
could be kept for the initial period (1965, 
1970, …, 1995) as they are either lagged in 
the replication dataset or (nearly) constant 
over time.
We decided to combine the  replication 
datasets and keep only the countries com mon 
to all of them. This procedure basically implies 
dropping a number of small- island states from 
the CH dataset and  (former) socialist coun-
tries from FL as well as  Hum phreys (2005). 
Sample size also depends on variable choices. 
As noted above, ongoing civil wars are coded 
as missing values, which implies that differ-
ences in sample size result from using either 
the CH or the UCDP/PRIO-based onset 
variable. Finally, sample size depends on data 
availability and hence varies with the choice 
of the independent variables.
We regress the CH as well as the UCDP/
PRIO-based onset variables on two different 
sets of independent variables using a logit 
model. The independent variables always 
include oil production per capita (oil ),13 pri-
mary commodity exports as share of GDP 
(sxp) multiplied by an oil-exporter dummy 
(oilsxp), and sxp, as well as the corresponding 
squared terms in order to capture ‘non-lin-
ear’ relationships. This allows us to account 
for the effect of both oil wealth, measured 
by oil, and oil dependence, proxied by oilsxp 
separately.
We include two different sets of addi-
tional control variables. In specifications 
I to III, we use a ‘preferred’ combination of 
controls from CH and (modified) variables 
from FL. The results are reported in Table II. 
 particular for lagged GDP per capita that 
appears as an explanatory variable in both 
studies. In addition, the assumed time 
structure (explanatory variables lagged by 
one year only) does not seem to adequately 
reflect the supposed transmission mechan-
isms.9 The following multivariate analysis 
rests on a dataset that is generated using 
three replication  datasets provided by CH, 
FL and Humphreys (2005).
The dependent dichotomous variable in 
the following regressions is defined as in CH 
and takes a value of 1 if a civil war started 
during a five-year period between 1965 and 
1999 (1965–69, …, 1995–99). It also takes 
a value of 1 if a war ended and another war 
started in the same five-year period. Ongoing 
civil wars are coded as missing observations, 
as the regressions intend to explain civil war 
onset, not duration.10 We use two different 
civil war onset variables in the following. 
The first is the civil war onset variable from 
CH; the second set of dependent variables 
is constructed according to the described 
principles based on UCDP/PRIO’s conflict 
database.11
As regards the explanatory variables, we 
use data on oil production (and reserves) 
from Humphreys (2005). Additional controls 
are taken from the replication datasets pro-
vided by CH and FL. As the replication data-
sets of FL and Humphreys contain an nual 
data, we had to transform the variables.12 
9 As the CH framework is not free from specification prob-
lems, we also ran regressions using the FL framework based 
on Humphreys’s (2005) replication data.
10 See Collier & Hoeffler (2004), who show that civil war 
onset and duration are governed by different mechanisms.
11 We constructed two onset variables. The first onset vari-
able is coded 1 for the onset of any conflict with more than 
25 battle-related deaths in at least one of the years of the 
five-year spell (all conflicts), the second variable only for 
those with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in one of the 
years (war). See Gleditsch et al. (2002) for details.
12 A Stata do-file that uses the replication datasets and per-
forms the necessary transformations is available from the 
authors upon request.
13 More precisely, oil production is measured by its value; 
that is, the production is multiplied with an oil price index 
also provided by Humphreys (2005). 
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on January 13, 2014jpr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
j ourna l  o f  P EACE R ESEARCH volume 46 / number 6 / november 2009766
Table II. Results from Multivariate Analyses
Independent variables Specification
I II III
Dependent variable
Civil war onset 
(All conflicts)
Civil war onset 
(Wars only)
Civil war onset 
(CH)
Oil production per capita (oil) 0.146*
(0.077)
0.131
(0.096)
0.229**
(0.089)
Oil production per capita2 −0.004**
(0.002)
−0.003
(0.002)
−0.005**
(0.002)
Primary commodity exports / GDP (sxp) 12.665**
(5.551)
18.866**
(9.293)
23.191***
(8.966)
(Primary commodity exports / GDP)2 (sxp2) −49.978***
(16.333)
−67.940**
(30.187)
−80.439***
(31.203)
(Primary commodity exports / GDP) × 
Oil dummy (oilsxp)
−8.567*
(5.057)
−14.681*
(8.393)
−18.759**
(8.006)
(Primary commodity exports / GDP)2 × 
Oil dummy
44.932***
(16.224)
65.739**
(30.302)
78.024**
(30.705)
Log GDP (FL) −0.260***
(0.057)
−0.256**
(0.101)
−0.338***
(0.105)
GDP growth (CH) −0.107***
(0.033)
−0.112***
(0.041)
−0.081**
(0.039)
Log population (CH) 0.154
(0.096)
0.084
(0.130)
0.191
(0.137)
Log of mountainous terrain (FL) 0.234**
(0.099)
0.469***
(0.144)
0.446***
(0.135)
Peace duration (CH) −0.001
(0.001)
−0.003***
(0.001)
−0.002**
(0.001)
Non-contiguous state (FL) 1.154***
(0.357)
1.100**
(0.555)
0.859*
(0.513)
Ethnic fractionalization (FL) 1.053**
(0.474)
1.123
(0.702)
−0.167
(0.601)
Ethnic dominance (CH) 0.320
(0.253)
0.594
(0.379)
0.595*
(0.351)
Constant −5.006***
(1.774)
−5.439**
(2.648)
−6.881**
(2.677)
Observations 692 710 742
Dropped outliers Liberia, 1980, 
1985; Saudi 
Arabia, 1975; 
Iraq, 1980 
Liberia, 1985; 
Iraq, 1980
Liberia, 1985, 
1990; Kuwait, 
1975
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. The analysis rests on 
128 (specification I) and 129 (specifications II and III) countries. For detailed variable descriptions see CH and FL. 
‘Standard’ control sets from CH are included 
in specifications IV to VI that are reported in 
Appendix 1. In all regressions, the significant 
coefficients of the controls have the expected 
sign. Among the controls, the level of GDP 
(specifications I–III) and GDP growth 
(all specifications), population (IV–VI), 
peace duration and geographic indicators 
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With regard to the effects of oil depen-
dence, we detect the expected U-shaped rela-
tionship. The positive coefficient of squared 
oilsxp is significant at least at the 10% level 
in five out of eight specifications. Yet, as our 
proxy for oil dependence is constructed as an 
interaction term of sxp and an oil exporter 
dummy, we have to consider the sum of the 
two effects or the sum of the four coefficients, 
including the two squared terms. The effect 
(e.g. mountainous areas) turn out to be rela-
tively robust across specifications.14
In only two of the six specifications, the 
effect of oil wealth corresponds to the hypoth-
esized expectations at high levels of signifi-
cance: oil wealth increases the risk of civil war 
onset at lower levels of this variable, while it 
decreases the risk at higher levels. Figure 1 
(based on results of specification I) illustrates 
this inverted U-shaped relationship between 
oil wealth and civil war risk. To put the results 
in perspective, it should be noted that in our 
dataset only Gabon, Iraq, Kuwait, Norway, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates 
surpass a threshold of 50 for the wealth proxy 
in at least one time spell. The ‘wealth effect’ 
in specification II is not significant, as in the 
specifications using the CH control set.15
14 The definition and construction of the control variables 
are discussed at length in CH and FL, respectively.
15 As a robustness check, we have also introduced squared 
wealth terms into the regressions reported by Humphreys 
Based on Specification I in Table II. The figure shows predicted probabilities for different levels of oil dependence, holding 
all other variables constant at the mean and varying oil production value per capita.
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
0 20 40 60 80 100
No dependence
Oilsxp = 60%
Oilsxp = 30%
Oilsxp = 90%
Oil production value per capita
Figure 1. Effects of Oil Wealth and Dependence on Civil War Onset Probability
(2005, Table 2). For both (lagged) production per capita 
and (lagged) oil production value per capita, the coef-
ficients of the squared terms have the expected negative 
sign. Yet, this effect is significant only at the 15% and 25% 
level, respectively. Because this regression does not con-
trol for dependency, as measured for example by sxp, we 
also matched Humphreys’s dataset with the CH data on 
sxp and oilsxp, hence proxying dependency in single years 
(e.g. for each year between 1985 and 1989) by five-year sxp 
averages of the preceding period (e.g. the 1980–84 sxp and 
oilsxp average). In this setup, neither sxp nor oilsxp (nor the 
squared terms) turn out to be significant, but the signs of 
the coefficients correspond to expectations. The effects of 
the oil wealth terms are hardly affected by the inclusion 
of sxp and oilsxp in this setup.
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In sum, the multivariate analysis allows us 
to draw only limited conclusions about the 
relationship between oil wealth and depend-
ence, on the one hand, and civil war risk, on 
the other. Yet, there is a tendency for high 
levels of oil dependence to be associated with 
high levels of civil war onset risk, while high 
levels of oil wealth appear to make countries 
less prone to civil war.
Macro-Qualitative Analysis
We now investigate our main hypotheses for 
a sample of 27 (net) oil-exporting countries 
(at least one year between 1973 and 2001), 
which had an average oilsxp and 2001. 
Thus, dependence is held relatively con-
stant, which particularly allows us to detect 
the assumed effects of different levels of oil 
wealth. We consider an oil exporter as oil-
rich if the country surpasses a cutoff point 
of approximately 25 barrels per person per 
day, which corresponds to over ten tonnes 
per capita per year in 1996 – the earliest 
point of time for which complete data for 
dependence and production were available. 
These 11 countries also include the five oil 
exporters that were missing in the multivari-
ate regressions.
Results turn out to be fairly impressive. 
All countries above the threshold of oil 
production per capita in 1996 were spared 
from any violent conflict measured through 
cumulated internal conflict intensity by 
UCDP/PRIO conflict data for the period 
1990–2005. Just three peaceful18 but oil-
poor countries deviate from our expectation 
(Kazakhstan, Syria, Turkmenistan), and even 
 regrouping Equatorial Guinea (no substantial 
of sxp maintains its inverted U-shape as, for 
example, in the original CH paper, which 
implies that very high levels of commodity 
dependence decrease civil war risk.16 The oil 
interaction hence counteracts this effect; yet, 
as can be seen in Figure 1, the onset prob-
ability holding dependency constant at 90% 
even lies below the ‘no dependence’ line. 
Yet, the inverted U-shape becomes flatter for 
lower levels of wealth (see Appendix 2).
Some technical notes are in order, which 
have important implications for the inter-
pretation of these findings. As regards the 
sample, it may be interesting that five cases 
with very high oil revenues per capita and 
without any civil war onset are missing 
(Brunei, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates). Moreover, the 
reported results are based on samples from 
which outliers have been removed systemati-
cally. We drop all influential outliers that we 
identify by Pregibon’s (1981) approximation 
to the change in the estimated coefficients 
given a specific observation is removed from 
the sample, as suggested by Long & Freese 
(2003). We do so in a loop until no such 
outlier is left in the sample, a procedure that 
leads to substantial reductions of the sample. 
We report these outliers for each specifica-
tion (see Table II and Appendix 1), and it 
is remarkable that they are almost exclu-
sively oil exporters. This strongly points to 
the existence of mechanisms that render oil 
countries special cases and that cannot be 
captured by the above reduced-form effects 
of wealth and dependence, even though they 
allow for some non-linearity.17
16  This implies that similar results may be obtained for 
non-oil commodities, once the effects of wealth and 
dependence are disentangled, given that, in the current 
framework, sxp rather proxies wealth than dependence. 
17 The regressions have also been run using a rare events 
(King & Zeng, 2001) instead of a standard logit model, 
as the share of ones, that is, the share of spells with onsets, 
lies only slightly above 5% for more intense conflicts (CH 
coding or ‘wars only’). In fact, using the rare events model 
has a considerable impact on coefficients and confidence 
levels in most specifications, in particular on the oil-related 
coefficients. This is likely to be due to combing one rare 
event, civil war onset, with another, being an oil-exporter. 
The main conclusions, however, remain valid. 
18 Generally, the term ‘peaceful’ is used in the sense of 
negative peace – that is, no violent conflict according to 
UCDP/PRIO data – and does not imply a completely 
peaceful society in the broader sense.
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on January 13, 2014jpr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Matth ia s  Ba s edau  & Jann  Lay  R E S O U R C E  C U R S E 769
distribution (as well as possibly low tax 
 burden) – can explain how resource or oil 
wealth may translate into peace. In the fol-
lowing, we assign pertinent indicators to 
the respective mechanisms for the sample of 
highly dependent net oil exporters.
With regard to the repression mechanism, 
we use arms imports per capita between 
1990 and 2000 as indicator for a huge 
 security appar atus (for details on data, see 
Appendix 4).19 We further examine whether 
the use of coercive measures translates into 
the political variant of repression – authori-
tarian rule – by looking at levels of demo-
cracy in terms of the average of the Freedom 
House political rights and civil liberties 
scores.20 Arms imports may also reflect the 
existence of military ties to external allies and 
hence the outside protectors mechanism. Yet, 
we find the permanent military presence of 
at least one permanent UN security council 
oil production in 1996) and Bahrain (wealth 
mainly from gas) would not contradict our 
hypotheses, given that we do not suggest that 
oil poverty necessarily produces violent out-
comes (see Table III).
Results are fairly robust, although some-
what weaker, with regard to other measures 
for conflict and instability, such as civil war 
onset (FL), the World Bank governance 
indicator ‘political stability & absence of 
violence’ (average, 1996–2004) and regime 
durability according to Polity IV (see 
Appen dix 3). Moreover, partial correlations 
(see Appendix 3) support the results from the 
macro- qualitative analysis: oil wealth in per 
capita terms above a certain cutoff point does 
not make civil war more likely, while depen-
dence does. In sum, the macro-qualitative 
analysis in the medium-N sample suggests 
that oil wealth compensates for the adverse 
effects of oil dependence on peace and stabil-
ity, once a certain threshold has been crossed.
Testing for Causal Mechanisms
As outlined in the literature review, several 
causal mechanisms – repression, outside pro-
tectors, clientelist networks and  large-scale 
19 Ross (2001) proxies repression by military expenditure 
as share of GDP and armed forces as a share of the labour 
force. For many oil-rich states, these indicators are not 
available.
20 We checked for robustness with the World Bank indica-
tor ‘voice and accountability’. We did not use Polity IV 
data because sparsely populated countries are not covered.
Table III. Oil Wealth and Civil Conflict in Highly Dependent Net Oil Exporters
 Peaceful 1990–2005 Conflict-ridden 1990–2005
Oil-rich (oil production p.c. 
over 10 tonnes p.a. 1996)
Bahrain* Norway   
Brunei Oman
Equat. Guinea** Qatar
Gabon Saudi Arabia
Kuwait UAE
Libya  
Oil-poor (oil production p.c. 
below 10 tonnes p.a. 1996)
Kazakhstan Algeria Nigeria 
Syria Angola Papua New Guinea 
Turkmenistan Azerbaijan Russia 
Congo Republic Trinidad & Tobago
Iran Uzbekistan 
Iraq Venezuela 
 Yemen 
‘Peaceful’ = no year of conflict; ‘conflict ridden’ = at least one year of conflict (all conflicts), according to UCDP/PRIO 
dataset 1990–2005; * Oil and gas; ** No substantial oil production in 1996, ‘oil-rich’ since 1999.
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The first column of Table IV shows that 
oil-rich and peaceful countries spend con-
siderably more on arms imports, and this 
finding is not confined to members of the 
Cooperation Council in the Persian Gulf 
whose high military spending may reflect 
historical external threat perceptions. Yet, 
the mere fact that oil-rich (and peaceful) 
countries import more arms does not neces-
sarily imply that the repression mechanism 
extends to authoritarianism or political 
repression. While most of the oil-rich states 
are repressive in political terms, this does 
not seem to distinguish them from many 
oil-poor countries. Although almost two-
thirds of the cases show the expected position 
vis-à-vis the threshold value of 5.4 – 
 indicating a fairly undemocratic regime – 
many oil-poor states are equally repressive 
in  political terms. Furthermore, these results 
are not robust with regard to other  measures 
of democracy such as ‘voice and account-
ability’ (not reported).23
Although foreign military presence might 
be designed to deter greedy outsiders, the 
outside protectors mechanism apparently 
also helps avoid domestic conflict. Except for 
Bahrain, Libya and Equatorial Guinea, all 
oil-rich countries allowed foreign troops on 
their soil to stay permanently – not only US 
military bases in the Persian Gulf, but also 
French (Gabon) or British (Brunei) military 
presence.
Large-scale distributional policies are 
employed by all oil-rich governments, except 
Equatorial Guinea, while most of the non-
rich countries cannot afford to pursue them. 
Noteworthy exceptions are Algeria, Iran, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, which 
member on the soil of the country in ques-
tion (1990–2000) a more adequate indicator 
for this mechanism. The third mechanism, 
large-scale distribution, is proxied by current 
government expenditures per capita (includ-
ing interest payments). For the theoretically 
less convincing variant – low tax burden – 
we use total taxes per capita (both in 1997). 
The patronage/clientelism mechanism is cer-
tainly most difficult to operationalize. Here 
we decided to use the World Bank Indicator 
control of corruption (1998) as a proxy vari-
able.21 Although clientelism and corruption 
are not exactly the same, we can assume that 
widely applied patronage is also accompanied 
by high levels of corruption. Patronage tends 
to negatively affect government effectiveness 
as well, which is why we also consider the 
respective World Bank indicator.
Indicator values for specific countries are 
judged against sample median values and we 
consider a causal mechanism to be at work 
if the respective country indicator value lies 
above/below (depending on the theoretical 
expectation and construction of the proxy) 
this threshold. For instance, we expect oil-rich 
countries to have government expenditure 
per capita values that are at least equal to or 
higher than the sample median. This exercise 
allows us to detect whether individual choices 
correspond to theoretical expectations and 
can be used to preliminarily judge the gen-
eral fit of the causal mechanisms. Table IV 
illustrates the results of this procedure, where 
the areas marked X depict a causal mech-
anism working in accordance with theory. 
The indicator values underlying Table IV as 
well as bivariate correlations (and significance 
values) are reported in Appendix 4.22
21 We could not obtain pertinent indicators, such as cabi-
net size, for a sufficient number of countries and/or years.
22 Significant bivariate correlations may add substantiat-
ing evidence. However, their explanatory value is limited 
because, as theory suggests and as the multivariate analysis 
has demonstrated, the considered relationships are unlikely 
to be linear.
23 If the inverted U-curve on the link between democracy 
and violent conflict is correct (Hegre et al., 2001), we must 
expect either very democratic or very authoritarian regimes 
in the (peaceful) oil-rich countries. If we use Freedom 
House ratings, it is merely Gabon and possibly Kuwait that 
deviate among the oil-rich countries. Yet, there are only 
four oil-poor countries that turn out to show the moderate 
levels of democracy identified as being conflict-prone.
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employ the three effective mechanisms 
simultaneously, which separates them from 
the bulk of the oil-poor countries. For 7 of 
11 oil-rich countries, we detect three causal 
mechanisms (high spending on the security 
apparatus, external allies and large-scale dis-
tributional policies). Most of them are Gulf 
petro-states, but they are joined by Brunei 
and Norway, the latter being the only full 
democracy among the oil-rich states. Bahrain 
comes close to the group, but lacks outside 
protection, as it does not host foreign troops 
on its territory.
The remaining three cases show more 
individual patterns. Libya seems to use only 
a huge security apparatus and large-scale dis-
tribution. Gabon does not spend a lot on its 
security apparatus, but hosts a French gar-
rison. In fact, French troops prevented the 
regime from being overthrown during the 
1990s, which shows that the ‘outside protec-
tion’ mechanism has high explanatory value 
in this country case. As regards large-scale 
distribution, Gabon is close to the median, 
and there is plenty of evidence of oil rents 
fuelling corruption and patronage in the 
country (Yates, 2005). The most distinctive 
case, however, is Equatorial Guinea, which 
deviates in virtually every respect: security 
spending is relatively low, there is no foreign 
military base, nor are there any signs for dis-
tributional policies. Corruption, however, is 
rampant, an interesting parallel to the Gabon 
case. When considering the case of Equatorial 
Guinea, it should be borne in mind that oil 
production started only very recently and 
was not accompanied by major institutional 
or political changes (Wood, 2004).
Given their relatively peaceful domestic 
politics, we may expect some causal mech-
anisms to be working in the oil-poor coun-
tries Kazakhstan, Syria and Turkmenistan: 
Syria apparently relies on repression and, 
compared to the oil-poor and violent 
states, exhibits relatively more favourable 
institutions (though close to the median, 
have values above the median that, however, 
can hardly compare to the spending rates of 
oil-rich states. Whereas proactive large-scale 
distribution is hence the expected success-
ful way to avoid domestic conflict, a low tax 
burden is adversely related to peace. Yet, it 
may be premature to conclude that taxing 
citizens guarantees stability. Our proxy also 
includes taxes from private companies, and 
these taxes tend to be high in oil-exporting 
countries. Maybe more importantly, low 
taxes in non-rich countries may rather reflect 
deficient tax collecting institutions, which is 
in line with our findings on the last causal 
mechanism.
We do not find patronage and clientelism 
to be an effective way to maintain peace. Our 
proxy variables ‘control of corruption’ and 
‘government effectiveness’ tend to display 
more favourable values for oil-rich countries 
in contrast to their oil-poor cousins. A pos-
sible reason could be that the latter cannot 
afford large-scale distribution and have to 
rely on patronage, which then proves not to 
be working well.
Yet, we should be cautious about drawing 
wide-ranging conclusions. Our proxies are 
second best and both indicators – as well as 
a low tax burden – can also be interpreted as 
proxies for weak states. In fact, oil-rich states 
have relatively better institutions or stron-
ger states (see also the strong and significant 
bivariate correlation between the institu-
tional indicators and per capita oil produc-
tion reported in Appendix 4). Whether this 
proves that better institutions prevent oil-
rich states from lapsing into violence and/or 
whether higher oil revenues tend to improve 
state institutions (at least within the group 
of oil exporters) cannot be answered at this 
point, given that data for institutional qual-
ity at the beginning of the oil age are almost 
impossible to obtain for all countries (see 
Ross, 2004: 338).
As regards individual countries, it is 
remarkable that most of the oil-rich states 
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distinguishing between resource wealth (in 
per capita terms) and dependence, which 
work in different directions as regards peace. 
This conceptualization matters beyond the 
reduced-form relationship between resource 
abundance and internal conflict and, hence, 
has implications for understanding the 
causal mechanisms behind it. Apparently, 
governments use the large resource revenues 
to maintain internal peace by combining a 
huge security apparatus with generous distri-
butional policies. Such policies are costly and 
oil-rich countries have to cross a fairly high 
threshold of per capita wealth to be able to 
apply them. In addition to these two trad-
itional rentier state mechanisms, we identify 
a role for the presence of outside protectors 
in achieving internal stability.
No evidence, however, can be found for 
using abundant oil rents to establish state 
institutions characterized by patronage and 
clientelism, another causal mechanism sug-
gested by the rentier state theory. We con-
cede that our empirical operationalizations 
of clientelism and patronage may rather 
proxy the quality of state institutions. In this 
view, however, our findings – including also 
their larger tax-raising capability – suggest a 
further challenge to the literature and point 
to a broader field of future research. In con-
trast to theoretical predictions of the ‘weak 
state’ mechanism, oil-wealthy states tend 
to have better state institutions than their 
oil-poor counterparts. Theoretically, this 
could be explained by a modified weak state 
mechanism. The higher available amounts of 
revenues per capita may have a positive net 
effect on the quality of institutions or on 
the strength of the state as a whole, at least 
compared to other similarly dependent oil-
exporting countries with lower revenues per 
capita.
Yet, one should not draw too far-ranging 
conclusions on the resources–institutions 
link, as the present study largely disregards 
important dynamic dimensions. More specific-
ally, we do not assess the role of i nstitutional 
see Appendix 3). The central Asian coun-
tries may well be different because of 
their Soviet legacy. A detailed compara-
tive analysis of these ‘post-Soviet-rentier’ 
states could yield interesting insights, given 
the similarities of these countries in con-
text variables (Soviet legacy, authoritarian 
regime) and possible differences in how 
resource rents are used.
Finally, 2 of 13 oil-poor and violent coun-
tries show patterns somewhat similar to those 
of the oil-rich and peaceful cases. Algeria 
and Iran have fairly high security expendi-
ture and engage in large-scale distribution 
policies. Yet, as already stated, government 
expenditure per capita is close to the sample 
median and thus not comparable to the lev-
els of spending in most oil-rich countries.
In sum, we can conclude that three 
causal mechanisms – a huge security appar-
atus, large-scale distribution and outside 
protection – distinguish the oil-rich from 
the oil-poor states. Possibly not completely 
unexpectedly, but in contradiction to the 
‘selective-cooptation’ mechanism, we find 
oil-rich countries to be less corrupt and to 
have more effective state institutions (also in 
terms of tax collecting capacity).
Conclusions
The debate on the resource–conflict link has 
been dominated by the notion of a negative 
impact of natural resources, particularly oil, 
on internal peace. Evidence presented in this 
article suggests a substantial modification of 
this idea. It is, if anything, dependence rather 
than wealth that creates problems. Oil export-
ers tend to be prone to violence as a group, 
but countries oil-rich in per capita terms are 
spared from internal violence despite being 
highly dependent. Regardless of the meth-
odology applied, one conclusion seems to 
be safe: in terms of per capita wealth of oil 
production, there is no paradox of plenty as 
regards the likelihood of civil conflict. The 
article hence illustrates the importance of 
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on January 13, 2014jpr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Matth ia s  Ba s edau  & Jann  Lay  R E S O U R C E  C U R S E 775
Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler, 2005. ‘Resource 
Rents, Governance, and Conflict’, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49(4): 625–633.
de Soysa, Indra, 2002a. ‘Paradise Is a Bazaar? 
Greed, Creed and Grievance in Civil War 
1989–1999’, Journal of Peace Research 39(4): 
395–416.
de Soysa, Indra, 2002b. ‘Ecoviolence: Shrinking 
Pie, or Honey Pot?’, Global Environmental 
Politics 2(4): 1–34.
Fearon, James D., 2005. ‘Primary Commodities 
and Civil War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 
49(4): 483–507.
Fearon, James D. & David Laitin, 2003. ‘Ethnicity, 
Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political 
Science Review 97(1): 75–90.
Fjelde, Hanne, 2009. ‘Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, 
Corruption and Civil War, 1985–99’, Journal 
of Peace Research 46(2): 199–218.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael 
Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard 
Strand, 2002. ‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: 
A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 
39(5): 615–637.
Hegre, Håvard; Scott Gates, Nils Petter 
Gleditsch & Tanja Ellingsen, 2001. ‘Toward a 
Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political 
Change and Civil War 1816–1992’, American 
Political Science Review 95(1): 34–48.
Herb, Michael, 2003. ‘No Representation 
Without Taxation? Rents, Development and 
Democracy’, manuscript, Georgia State Uni-
versity (http://www2.gsu.edu/~polmfh/herb_
rentier_state.pdf ).
Humphreys, Macartan, 2005. ‘Natural Resources, 
Conflict and Conflict Resolution’, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49(4): 508–537.
Johnston, Michael, 1986. ‘The Political Con-
sequences of Corruption. A Reassessment’, 
Comparative Politics 18(4): 459–477.
Karl, Terry Lynn, 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: 
Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press.
King, Gary & Langche Zeng, 2001. ‘Logistic 
Regression in Rare Events Data’, Political 
Analysis 9(2): 137–163.
Le Billon, Philippe, 2001. ‘The Political Ecology of 
War. Natural Resources and Armed Conflict’, 
Political Geography 20(5): 561–584.
Le Billon, Philippe, 2003. ‘Buying Peace or 
Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in 
 conditions at the time when oil was discov-
ered. An empirical analysis of such dynam-
ics may, however, not be feasible in the type 
of cross-country comparisons employed in 
this article because of data shortcomings 
(e.g. institutional data when countries start 
to exploit resources) and analytical problems 
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with sufficient degrees of freedom and ade-
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Although oil-rich countries are spared 
from violence and tend to have relatively bet-
ter institutions, all this is not to say that oil 
abundance is generally a blessing for them. 
In most of these countries, oil seems to work 
to uphold authoritarian regimes, whose pres-
ence will be seen as socially undesirable from 
many other perspectives except for internal 
stability. Moreover, our analysis ignores 
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ters for the resource–conflict link. Many 
countries may face serious conflict once oil 
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